(A) DOWRY: Dowry by Whartons law dictionary: otherwise called maritagium, or marriage goods, that which the wife brings the husband in marriage.
There is hardly any malaise predominant in the society which can be termed as a stigma on the dignity of the womanhood in India than dowry. The newly wedded girl is treated as a gold mine and failing of which leads the in-laws treat her as combustible material and resultant is the commitment of suicide by the bride.
To start with even modern, well-educated families start saving up money for their daughter’s dowry as soon as she is born so what can one expect from the uneducated masses, whose only form of education is tradition? Come festivals like Diwali or Holi, and the parents of the daughter flood her in-laws with gifts. If gifts are expected – your daughter is married into the wrong family. If such giving is self-inflicted, you’re making a mistake. Give a token present to your daughter. If you want to give her something more, do so, but don’t feel pressured to give anything more than you receive to her in-laws.
The societal perception of the society is that women are less strong as compared to men। This manifests in what she calls “Zero-political Status”, and denial of basic civil rights to them।[2] This gender inequality and discrimination are so deeply rooted that at places where wife earns also she is confronted with such evils। Hence, dowry is so strongly prevalent not because of the mismatch of the demand of the gifts and the presents received but as women lacks political status and role in their own family. It’s evident that even if demand for dowry is being satisfied the evil will not be abolished and women will continue to face exploitation because of the custom-sanctioned inferiority that robs them of the basic human rights. As she
doesn’t possess a political and significant stand in the family is left with either one of the options
1। She succumbs and procures the demanded goods from her parents after initially deflecting some of the burdening demands and by tolerating the physical brutality herself। 2। Secondly she does not comply at a great personal risk, and high emotional cost, and often sustain resistance for dowry। Dowry in the society is deep rooted due to social, economical, biological an even legal loopholes। It’s the society and its acceptance by many has created a hindrance in uprooting this social evil। Many legislations and acts were being passed by states to curb the problem but due to improper implementation and lack of effectiveness were not able to cease the problem. There are many other crimes associated with dowry i.e. dowry deaths, murders, suicide, misappropriation of property.
Moreover the mental set up of Indian women do not let them accept the failure of the marriage nor let them break the same for shame or for the dignity of her parents and end up killing themselves. This is constant erosion of basic human values, dignity, tolerance and spirit of live and let live.
(B) DEFINITIONS OF DOWRY: • According to the dowry prohibition act, 1961 the term dowry means: Any property or valuable security given or agreed to be either directly or indirectly – (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to marriage (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person। At or before connection with the marriage of the said parties, buy does not include dower or
Mahr in the case of persons to whom Muslim personal law (shariat) law applies.
In simple words it means the consideration given by the brides father to the groom for marrying her. It is symbol of social injustice and is a result of growing disparities.[3]
Origin of the Dowry System
The Vedic phase was a golden period for the women. Marriage was considered sacred and was more of a necessity than a social contract. Wife was considered as ‘ardhangini’. In Hindu customs and during vedic period the brides are given to the grooms known as ‘kanyadan’ along with some gifts. ‘Kanya’ means the gal and ‘Dana’ means the gift. According to Rig Veda it was believed that without presenting ‘Dakshina’ to the bride the custom of ‘Kanyadan’ is incomplete. Hence ‘Kanyadan’ and ‘Varadakshina’ became intimately associated. This was a voluntary tradition out of love and affection of the parents of the bride but during the course of time a coercive element has crept in. It has taken deep roots not only in the marriage but also post-marriage relationship. The decent ritual of ‘Dakshina’ to the bridegroom has assumed the nomenclature of “dowry”. The Atharva Veda refers to a royal bride bringing dowry of 100 cows. (Domestic violence act, PreetiMishra 120) it is said that RishiKarav gave a number of gifts to his daughter, Shakuntala when she married King Dushayant.
During the Smriti period women were exploited the most and that is why this period was termed as Dark Age for women. When British took over around the 19th century dowry had grown up to become a big evil difficult to uproot from the society.
Present aspect
Status of women in present society
Today women are the marginalised sections of the society. The increasing crime rate toward women had lead to decline in the status of women and symbolises the powerless position in the society. In the terms of the typical society it’s the marital status which provides identity to the women. Though much legislation and measures have been taken to abolish dowry prevalent in the society it’s still predominant in the society in some or the other form. Nowadays, weddings are expected to be lavish even if the bride’s parents cannot afford it. Before the marriage itself everything to be given and gifted is being decided between the parties. At times marriage depends upon the amount the bride’s parents are ready to spend on her wedding. This is exploitation of women and a form of dowry at present. The legislation passed by the govt. has many loopholes and provides with many ways and means to take dowry without even falling in the ambit of the act. Indian Parliament has criminalised domestic violence. The Parliament amended the Penal Code in 1986 to explicitly provide that dowry deaths are punishable with imprisonment between seven years and life. Moreover Code of criminal procedure also establishes need of investigating into any suspicious death or suicide of any women within a period less than 7years as of marriage. Finally, in addition to criminal laws, the Parliament amended the Indian Evidence Act, which now creates a presumption of dowry death whenever a woman is subjected to dowry-related cruelty or harassment soon before her death.
Causes
Women have been subjected to such social as well as economical deprivation that there is a lack of awareness for crimes against them. Women are reared in the environment where they slowly though positively starts feeling inferior to man. The mentality of the women changes so drastically that they don’t find anything wrong in the crimes and cruelty committed against her. The main factors are: • Lack of awareness of the seriousness of the evil and the general mentality and acceptance of women’s inferiority to men. • Denial of violence by women due to there upbringing and cultural conditions and social attitudes. • Indian society is male dominated and women are brought up to be submissive and never to oppose the authority. Religion has restricted instead of improving the status and rights of the women. The factor of egoism in men to be superior also plays a chief role in degrading status of women in the society. • Lack of education is the main cause of the depth of this social evil. Once economic independence comes in women the evil of dowry will naturally die. • Lack of proper legal system and ambiguity in the legislations is one of the causes why dowry is still prevalent so strongly in Indian society. • The modern system of dowry is a problem of conformist culture which makes its almost impossible to uproot the evil. • Parents provide with dowry with a view of helping the newly wedded in establishment of the new household.
Dowry-related legislations
Enactments related to dowry
As a woman had no right to inherit a share of the ancestral property ‘streedhan’ was seen as a way by which the family ensured that she had access to some of its wealth. The law of ‘Streedhan’ (‘Stree’ means women and ‘Dhan’ means wealth) was originally formulated for the protection of women in the society and lays down that the property given by the parents to the bride absolutely belongs to the women but as time passed this safety net eroded to become the price tag for the groom and consequently the noose for the bride. Many reformers had taken initiatives to overcome the evil of dowry. A good example of it can be “SindDetiLeti Act , 1939” which aimed at abolition of evils related to dowry but it neither had impact nor created the desired effect. The next step was perceived in clause (1) of section 93 of Hindu Code Bill where it declared dowry shall deemed to be the property of the bride, and person who receives it should hold it in trust. Bihar and AP enacted ‘Bihar dowry restraint act’ and ‘AP dowry restraint act’ but both these enactments failed. After the enactment of the Hindu succession act 1956 the govt., felt that a separate legislation to prohibit dowry was not a matter of urgency, but due to the increase in the crime related to dowry and under both political and social obligations govt. decided to pass a legislation the dowry prohibition Act was introduced.
Dowry is the most prominent cause of domestic violence. It is being referred to as social cancer, a cruel custom and an insult to the dignity of the woman. It’s a general conception that evil of dowry is prevalent in the Hindu community but it is not true. Dowry prevails equally in almost all communities including Christians and Muslims. Muslim practice of “salami” after Nikah ceremony is the form of dowry.Most important hurdle in curbing the problem is that dowry is not being defined satisfactorily. There is fine distinction between voluntary gifts and extorted cash but if it’s demanded it takes a form of dowry. It has been crystallized in our society and despite of much legislation the no. of cases dealing with dowry is increasing day by day.
Under article sec 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 it is provided that the property of the female is her absolute property.[10] Hence, the fundamental of dowry as in the ancient times cannot be applied today, but there is an ever growing demand both at the time of marriage as well as after the marriage which gravely affects the status of women.
Various indirect and sophisticated methods have been used to demand dowry and to avoid application of the act. To increase its effectiveness, the government has twice amended the Act, in 1984 and 1986. The amendment done laid down the necessity and role of magistrate and the police to investigate into any unnatural death of a woman married less than 7yrs.
According to the dowry act 1961, dowry is a bailable and non-cognizable offence and ceases to be recognized if demand is are made or met one year after the marriage.[11] Most of such crimes occur within the in-laws house and with conspiracy of the family members and hence unwilling to provide with the evidences which ultimate leads to the in ability to convict for lack of proof.
Provisions related to dowry
• Dowry prohibition act, 1961: prohibits the giving and taking of dowry – the act extends to the whole of India except the state of Jammu or Kashmir। • Section 304-B of Indian penal code “introduced in the IPC by the dowry prohibition act, 1986: to punish dowry deaths (ESP to curb the evil of bride burning) • Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act: Raises, in certain circumstances, a presumption of dowry death of women. • Section 498-A of IPC: punishes cruelty and harassment, by husband or his relatives, of a married woman. • Section 113-A of the Evidence Act: Raises, in certain circumstances, a presumption that the commission of suicide by a married woman has been abetted by the husband or his relatives. • Section 174(3) of CPC : the section which refers to the enquiry and report by police n case of suicide or death in abnormal circumstances which includes crimes related to women like suicide and death of women within 7yrs. • Section 176 of CPC: This section refers inquiry by a magistrate into a cause of death, compels the magistrate to hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of, or in addition to the investigation of the police officer, and to secure for post-mortem in all cases where a woman has, within 7 years of her marriage.
• The dower or Mahr given during marriage under the Shariat (Muslim Personal) Law. • Gifts that are given to the bride or the bridegroom at the time of the marriage (without any demand being made) will not amount to dowry, if such presents are entered in a list in the following manner The bride as well as the bridegroom shall maintain the list of presents along with a brief description of the presents and the presenter with their signs given to the bride and it should be in writing at the time of marriage (III) CASES: (A) CASES RELATED TO DOWRY: Dowry harassment cases have eroded the entire base of womanhood in India. Suicides and deaths are a part of tragic drama of domestic violence enacted everyday in some or the other part of the country. At the modest estimates figure of deaths in India that occur due to non payment or partial payment of dowry is unnerving.
The right to life is a fundamental right to everyone. What does this mean that the women trapped in marriages that are so demanding are sure of death and they have no right to live in the society?
One of the famous case is SunilBajaj v. State of M.P[12] which points out the drawback of the section 304-B in the sense of its misinterpretation of the act against the innocent person. In most of the cases the motive behind the death is not seen. The proof may have disappeared with the death of the wife. For the reasons of self-condemning proof, she may have chosen to keep it secret, where the husband or his relatives may not be in a position to lead the evidence to it.
Misuse of the legislation
The observation of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab[13] is very relevant regarding the misuse of the provisions. One more point to be noticed is that in many cases relating to dying declarations the victim can conspire to convict the in-laws which is misuse of the law. Sometimes when dying declarations is given is without any foul play but after she consults her parents she alleges a foul play and demands a change in her declaration.There is no provision in the existing law, which may act as a safeguard against these types of practices.
Chief reasons of ineffective implementation of legislations
Statutory language is too vague to be effectively implemented. dowry prohibition act doest not cover every aspect in which the crime can be evaded. Even if laws are made stringent it need to be taken care that enforcement is strict and consistent. Most of the domestic violence cases go unrecorded as they are termed as “kitchen accidents”. Investigations take years and hence it takes years to file a charge sheet and till then evidences available disappears. Moreover often relatives are reticent to get involved. The cultural attitude towards women in India serves as a hindrance in strict enforcement of the laws. Hindu customs and Social mores dictates that a wife should never go against the husband and broken marriage it viewed as a disgrace to her honour. As no law guarantees women equal employment opportunities it prevents women from becoming economically independent, Indian society compels them to remain in abusive relationships, even if their husbands have tried to murder them.
Measures to be taken
(1) Shifting from our ancient value based society to a society in which women were respected as equally as men and to achieve the lost dignity, women should be economically independent as in western countries (2) In any case involving dowry crime should be investigated promptly। More women police officers should be involved for proper investigation of crime against women. (3) Pendency of the cases should be disposed when it’s fresh in the minds of the public so that it can act as a deterrent for the society. An example of this can be lichhamadevi case v. state of rajastan[14] where death sentence was inflicted on the mother-in-law for burning her daughter-in-law but then it was converted to life imprisonment. Moreover, code of criminal procedure was being amended to increase in no. of judicial officers appointed in metropolitan and setting up of fast track court. Registration of marriage and the gifts presented on or after that should me made stringent. While no time limit is being prescribed to deal with the cases related to dowry both govt and judiciary should take measures towards it. (4) Dowry is a social scourge and public opinion has to be mobilized against this cancerous evils. The memorable words of Mahatma Gandhi, Acceptance of dowry is a disgrace for the young man who accepts it as well as perhaps a dishonor for the woman folk should ring in the ears of every unmarried young man or woman. (5) A legal literacy programme should also be started to make the women of the downtrodden class aware of their legal rights. In all this voluntary organizations can play an important role. There are no flashy solutions of this deep-seated social malaise. (6) Women in India are nor coparceners with men. They should be provided with a part of the property of the in-laws after the marriage so that she is given a status of son of her father-in-law. (7) Moreover many Hindu customs gives right only to sons. For e.g. light the pyre. Women should be given equal status and should be allowed to perform the rituals thereby giving women back there dignity and respect. (8) Mental set up of the parents and the girl who considers themselves inferior to them and keep silence as to the fear of loosing the groom or the offer of marriage should be changed.
Conclusion
Dowry leads to the decline of general status of women; female children are undesired and hence are ill treated. It also led to breakage of family and matrimonial relationship. It is to be noted that it is not totally fair to expect police, judiciary nag govt. to take steps to eradicate social problems alone. This mentality of doing nothing but expecting from the govt need to be changed as tacit problem like dowry cannot be tackled by law alone till the time it has a social sanction behind it. First of all the discriminatory practices in marriage which are product of patriarchal norms should be eliminated. It’s utter shame that a women or a girl is considered a burden and a liability in the family as well as in the society as a whole and are termed as “weaker sex”. Moreover, Smritis picturized women as inferior and subordinate to men. Moreover, most of the cases are given a shape of kitchen accidents or suicides and at times the family hesitates to any action due to fear of loss of dignity or due a dominant position of the in-laws. Hence the dowry system can be abolished when the members of the society themselves takes initiatives to change the mentality towards females rather than depending on the government to legislate. In a nutshell we[who?] need to respect human life and its dignity which is gradually being snatched coercively from the women। Customs, norms and values can not be changes in a blink of an eye but effective implementation of the legislations is the need of the hour. Providing your daughter with a solid education, and encouraging her to pursue a career of her choice is the best dowry any parent can ever give their daughter.
There is no doubt that Ashoka’s personal religion was Buddhism. In hisBhabru edict he says he had full faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha. He showed respect to all sects and faiths and believed in using among ethical and moral values of all sects. In Rock Edict VII he says all seeks desire both self control and purity of mind. In Rock Edict XII he pronounces his policy of equal respect to all religious sects more clearly.
The Dhamma as explained in Ashoka’s edicts is not a religion or a religious system but a moral law, a common code of conduct or an ethical order. In Pillar Edict II Ashoka himself puts the question what is Dhamma? Then he enumerates two basic attributes or constituents of Dhamma: less evil and many good deeds. He says such
evils as rage, cruelty, anger, pride and envy
are to be avoided and many
good deeds like kindness, liberty, truthfulness, gentleness, selfcontrol, purity of heart, attachment to morality, inner and outer purity etc
are to be pursued vigorously. Ashoka established hospitals for humans and animals and made liberal donations to the Brahmans and ascetics of different religious sects.
He erected rest houses, caused wells to be dug and trees to be planted along the roads.
Ashoka took for the propagation of Buddhism.
He conducted Dharamyatrasand instructed his officials to do the same. He appointed special class of officials called Dharamahamatras whose sole responsibility was to propagate Dhamma among the people. Ashoka sent missions to foreign countries also to propagate dhamma. His missionaries went to western Asia, Egypt and Eastern Europe. Of the Foreign kings whose kingdoms thus received the message of Buddhism five are mentioned in the inscriptions of Ashoka namely Antiochus, Syria and Western Asia, Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt, AntigonusGonatas of Macedonia, Megas of Cyrene and Alexander of Epirus. Ashoka even sent his son Mahendra and daughter Sanghamitra to propagate Buddhism in Srilanka.
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What’s the real problem of the Middle East ( the holy lands)? Reader comment on item: Hope for the Middle East
Submitted by Oğuzhan Konez (Turkey), The history of the humankind is so weird. Therefore the world policy is much too weird too. If you want to search the root of mankind’s historical policy, you have to reverse your time to primitive ages. As you know, you will have to change your place too, since the place and the time must be considered together. Naturally, the winds of this roots will make you a voyage to the old and ancient lands. These lands are the Middle East. Lots of the civilizations were born and they died in these holy lands, respectively. The Middle East is the real root of us.
In ancient years these lands were famous and associated with the prophets and the religions. This zone is so significant for Jews and Muslims and Christs.They are all agreed that the Middle East is so sacred for them. There are lots of antique buildings and sacred scriptures. Especially Jerusalem is so important to worship and pray. The faithful people around the world get together in Jerusalem. Especially the Al Aksa Mosque and The King Solomon’s temple are associated with Jerusalem and also the land of the Middle east. These places are sacred because the main prophets were there.
Nonetheless, nowadays the biggest powers are not interested in holiness.They all pay attention to the petrols and the strategic importance of the Middle East. The problem of Palestine and Israel is the symbol and it is the external side of the conflicts. The real and internal problem is economics absolutely. We have to have a glance to the policy of the US. The US’ economic power is reducing everyday since the East countries such as Malasia, Thaivan and especially China are so powerful because of the cheap labour. The EU is an another factor which can cause a problem against the US. The monopoly corporations replace to the East. The one of the main branches is being exterminated in the hand of the US. ( Policy, Army and Financial) The economic one is in danger now. The US has to increase his influence on world, but how?
The US invaded Iraq owing to abuse of Saddam Hussein’s weapons. It seems that their other invasion will be on Iran. In addition to this, this invasion will proceed until the petrol of the Hazar Lake. The US have to control the petrol wells to be dominant on worldwide policy. As they can’t produce goods with lower prices against China.
The policy of Russia and the EU and Egypt have such predominant behaviours on the Middle East. They want to possess some proportion from the oppression of the Middle East. Nonetheless, the main factor is wounded America. He is bleeding on account of the debts and hatreds of other people from the remote lands of the world.
As you estimate, the old land is the target of people like ancient years. The only difference is between holiness and finance but maybe there wouldn’t have been any differences. Maybe the problem is the blender of the monetary issues and the holy of God. We could never find the real point of solution of the questions. It is not the problem of Math or Physics or logic. It is the problem of people and this is the worst one of course.
Georgia’s disastrous defeat in the conflict of August 2008 is not all it seemed. The losses are clear and devastating, but Tbilisi has – albeit in less tangible ways – gained too. The outlines of a more realistic national project are becoming visible, says Donald Rayfield.
(This article was first published on 6 August 2009)
7 – 08 – 2009
It may appear that any attempt to provide a definitive assessment of Georgia’s war with Russia on 8-12 August 2008 is premature, for the very good reason that the broader conflict of which this disastrous eruption was a part is itself far from over. A year on, political and military tensions continue to swirl around Georgia; parts of its territory remain occupied by Russian forces, its opposition forces sustain a near-permanent campaign to unseat President Mikheil Saakashvili, and its lost territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are further than ever from its grasp.
A case in point is the forthcoming report by the European Union’s Commission of Investigation into the true sequence of events around the conflagration in Tskhinvali on 7-8 August 2008 which sparked the war, due (after delays related to perceived time-sensitivity) to be published on 7 August 2009. This will be followed by demonstrations in the centre of Tbilisi (one anti-government, one anti-Russian), where the opportunity for serious clashes is evident.
The story of the 2008 war, then, is one of unfinished business. Yet where Georgia is concerned, a fairly resilient profit-and-loss account may still be feasible; for the overall shape of what has resulted seems to be clear even if many details about the war itself are still to be established.
Georgia’s four deficits
In this light, the perspective of a year suggests that Georgia has experienced four clear losses.
The two territories
First, the loss of a fifth of Georgia’s former territory to Russian-backed separatists now looks irretrievable. What population movement there was from what might be called “Georgia proper” (or “Georgian Georgia”) to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is now down to a tiny trickle of pedestrians (and, in the case of South Ossetia, even that movement has in both directions been halted as the war’sanniversary nears).
The support for Georgia’s territorial integrity from the United States and European Union has proved to be empty verbiage, and arguably have proved more damaging than a frank reassessment of the situation would have been.
Abkhazia has reconciled itself to its revised constitutional and political status (de jure as a protected pariah, de facto as a part of the Russian Federation); it restricts its hostility to denying Georgian villagers’ access to their hazelnut plantations, or to insisting that Georgian workers on the shared hydroelectric station on the Inguri river (which forms the border with Georgia) take out Russian citizenship.
The educated elite that leads the Abkhaz government from the capital, Sukhumi, permits discussions between Abkhaz and Georgian intellectuals on the future of the territory and its relations with Georgia to take place; these are conducted under the auspices of the Berghof Research Centre, and in safely remote places where the issues between them have obvious relevance (such as Kosovo).
South Ossetia’s condition is rather different, reflecting the variations that (despite their being often lumped together) always existed between the two “breakaway” statelets. The South Ossetian government is much more a puppet-theatre of Russian thugs and ex-security men; the new prime minister is Vadim Brovstev, a construction magnate from Cheliabinsk, a figure who has as tenuous a connection to Ossetia as most of its previous rulers.
The leadership in Tskhinvali maintains a spectacularly aggressive stance towards Tbilisi. It demands that Georgia cede to South Ossetia areas that were never in the region (such as the glacial Trus valley, which sixty-five Ossetian families regard as their ancestral home). There is little doubt that occasional mortar-fire from the Ossetian side of the border and continued ethnic cleansing of the Georgian villagers who remain will persist in the hope of provoking serious conflict.
The America-Russia factor
Second, Mikheil Saakashvili’s political calculation that a combative stance towards Russia would earn him greater support from the United States has seriously backfired. If Georgia’s president really thought (or worse, if his American advisers intimated) that provoking Russia would result in a conflict so bloody that the avowed Georgia-lover and Republican presidential candidate John McCain could use it as a launch-pad to the White House, his judgment is even more erratic than was always feared.
The sight of Barack Obama’s deputy, US vice-president Joe Biden limply shaking Saakashvili’s hand during his visit on 22-23 July 2009 – almost as reluctant as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei awkward receipt of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s kiss – spoke louder than any words of how far Georgia had receded from the forefront of American political thinking.
More broadly, the sense that Georgia is a country of great strategic importance to Washington, not least as a transit-route for the west’s energy supplies, has been overshadowed by larger considerations. The US needs Russia far more – for example, to overfly central Asia on the way to Afghanistan, and to help in the efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear programme.
The economic fallout
Third, Georgia’s economy and infrastructure was hideously damaged by the August 2008 war. Russia’s forces destroyed a substantial amount of Georgia’s military equipment and physical capital (including bridges, buildings, and roads); they also displaced around 20,000 Georgians, who – in addition to the many thousands more forced into flight by the conflicts of the early 1990s – need to be rehoused and provided with the means of access to food and healthcare.
The replacement and repair work is ongoing, but what is less straightforwardly healed is the shattered confidence of foreign investors and of international and local business. This, after all, is already a period of economic difficulty, which only accentuates the problems of the nearly 40% of Georgia’s population that live in poverty (including the estimated 30% who are undernourished).
In this respect, two sets of figures are genuinely alarming. First, in January-June 2009 only 600,000 tourists visited Georgia, compared to 1.3 million for the same period in 2008 (it is worth noting that Tbilisi classifies all foreign visitors, the American colonel and the Turkish minibar-salesman alike, as tourists). For a country with population of 4 million, the loss of so many visitors represents a major source of income.
Second, the planned railway between Tbilisi and the Turkish eastern border-town of Kars – announced with fanfare in 2005, and with a scheduled opening-date of 2010 – no longer reports its progress. The Turks are languidly building their own 80 kilometres to the Georgian frontier and the city of Akhalkalaki, while the Georgians are talking about modernising their narrow-gauge line onwards to Tbilisi. But as of 30 July 2009, the railway’s financial backers – Azeri, reflecting the fact that the line’s construction was meant to benefit Baku even more than Tbilisi – had paid out only $25 million of the promised (and required) $200-million loan.
The attraction of embarking at London’s Kings Cross and alighting days later in Tbilisi (itself dependent on the completion of the Bosphorus tunnel) may always have belonged more to touristic fantasy than humdrum reality (especially given the state of the Ankara-Kars line and arduous Georgian border-procedures that include gauge-transfers) was probably always overstated. But the railway, like the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, had a symbolic importance far greater than its economic potential. The indicators of its stalling are significant indeed.
The political carousel
Fourth, the deterioration in Georgia’s public and political life has accelerated to cast further doubt over its prospects of democratic progress. MikheilSaakashvili’s once-charmed political reputation had already been greatly tarnished by the closure of an independent TV station and then (in November 2007) the brutal suppression of opposition demonstrators; but it has suffered even more from the combined recklessness and callousness of his conduct of the August 2008 war.
The legacy of the calamitous assault on Tskhinvali – which involved shelling a city inhabited by civilians, while failing to block the Roki tunnel (the only access-route available for the enemy’s intended counter-invasion), the flood of blatant misinformation poured over foreign politicians and journalists, all justified by Saakashvili’s near-hysterical public appearances – has been the alienation of the president’s political allies as well as much of the Georgian electorate.
The results are everywhere, and in some cases alarming. The former parliamentary speaker Nino Burdzhanadze, the third of the “rose revolution” triumvirate (along with the mysteriously deceased Zurab Zhvania and Saakashvili himself), now seeks directly to replace the president, using street-protests as a vehicle. More disturbing are some of the candidates for the presidency who have emerged: among them Alexander Ebralidze (a godfather of St Petersburg’s mafia) and Giorgi Targamadze (the pro-Russian Christian Democrat leader and former aide to Aslan Abashidze, one-time boss of Georgia’s southwest Adzharia region).
The most reputable figure in Georgian public life is Sozar Subari, the country’s ombudsman and public defender; Subari is also a former journalist and deacon of the Orthodox church, who was beaten up by Saakashvili’s thugs in 2007). Now he is to relinquish his post on 16 September 2009, which is to be filled to by the yes-man Giorgi Tughushi. This is just the most worrying example of the dizzying cabinet merry-go-round in Tbilisi, where ministers are sacked and hired with abandon and in a way that can only reinforce the erratic and counterproductive nature of the Georgian government’s policy-making.
The examples are legion. The abrupt decision of the economics ministry to raise (and by a vast amount) the transit-charges for shipped containers – one of Georgia’s main sources of income – added to unconscionable port charges that make Poti three times as expensive as Shanghai to use; the result was a strike by international heavy-goods haulers that lasted a week. This, like other parts of the Mikheil Saakashvili circus-act – confessing his disastrous miscalculations to the Wall Street Journal then denying his words, dispatching his foreign ministers with ludicrous abandon – makes clear to the world that Georgia no longer has any consistent or calm voice.
Georgia’s four gains
It may seem absurd to say that Georgia achieved anything from what was so clearly a military debacle. It is possible, however, to make the case that Tbilisi has accrued four benefits from the war of August 2008.
The new realism
First, the very clarity of defeat means that Georgia can in principle – rather like an amputee who has lost a beautiful but gangrenous pair of legs – now concentrate on the process of national rehabilitation. If the pain of removal is yet to become fully accepted, at least it can be said that the endless, dangerous and febrile rhetoric about recovering lost territory has died down.
Indeed, to a limited extent a lesson seems to have been learned. Another fractious minority, the around 250,000 Armenians who live (mostly in poverty) in the southeast Javakheti region no longer have to endure arbitrary arrest or beatings for asserting their rights and views. Georgia’s often embittered relations with Armenia (in which the Tbilisi-Kars railway project, designed to bypass Armenian territory, was another irritant) have considerably improved.
In addition, the very presence of heavily armed Russian troops on Georgia’s northern borders – enough indeed to overwhelm and paralyse the country within hours – has provoked Tbilisi to launch a flurry of strategic projects that could be of longer-term benefit. These include the opening of a new airport at Batumi, used also to serve by Turkish citizens travelling to or from Hopa and Rize; the building of a new east-west line of communication further to Georgia’s south, rehabilitating the currently dreadful route connecting Bolnisi to Akhalkalaki and Batumi; and the plan to make Kutaisi, the true centre of Georgia, into a joint capital city (including a relocation of the national parliament there).
Such initiatives, if guided by a genuine decentralising purpose, will revive the provinces and their agricultural production; if they are combined with a championing of good ethnic relationships (in conditions where, for instance, tens of thousands of Ossetians live in harmony with Georgians in towns and villages all round Tbilisi), the result could be a genuine restoration of civic life.
The Russian mirror
Second, Georgia loss in the war of August 2008 does not translate into a Russian victory. Moscow’s declared aim of regime-change in Tbilisi achieved the opposite: it saved Mikheil Saakashvili from what would otherwise have been his humiliating rejection by an angry populace. At most, Russia managed to steal the title-deeds to territory it had already in effect appropriated.
The war vaporised any illusions that Russia was moving in a democratic or Europe-oriented direction. The brutality of Ossetian irregulars and Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen contingents exceeded the war-crimes committed by Georgian forces in Tskhinvali. The Georgians as a result were awarded the sympathy due to victims; and though denied any support whatsoever in pursuit of the reclamation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they have been supplied with much of the necessary finance and materials for reconstruction. These are being applied with some vigour, in financial conditions where the Georgian lari has held up well against the dollar and inflation is minimal.
The opening door
Third, a certain space of political and civic freedom has opened in Georgia’s public life. There have been fewer extra-judicial detentions and assaults on opponents. Georgia’s journalists are bolder. Even in 2007 they dared to screen a film to 3,000 people in Tbilisi’s Vake park which proved that Zurab Zhvania’s death (allegedly through a faulty gas-heater) must have been murder; now such subjects can be aired in print.
There have even in the wake of the August 2008 war been apparent improvements in Mikheil Saakashvili’s notorious (if under-reported) behaviour. There are no recent photos or accounts of harassment on a scale that even Silvio Berlusconi might have shunned; his official car no longer brakes at the sight of a pretty young woman so that he can get out and invite her to join the presidential secretariat (in scenes reminiscent of Lavrenti Beria‘s odious example).
Georgia is still more authoritarian than it was in 2003: people are careful about what they say on cellphones or write on the internet, and researchers for foreign firms are now hard to find. But the cultural scene has been transformed. Many satirical novels, poems and plays are published; some of them – like Lasha Bughadze’s story The First Russian – so scurrilous that it was condemned by both patriarch and parliament; while Kote Qubaneishvili’s short lyrics (koteclasms and kotestrophes) reveal a fresh political wisdom:
“Once again bullets begin to fall,
the Russian language remains on the air,
Barley and bran have gone up in price,
Nato cannot come to liberate …”
The bitter lesson
Fourth, and most important of all, Georgians have relearned a bitter political truth – one they have needed to be reminded of in almost every century of their long history. It can best be conveyed by example and precedent:
* In the 12th century, King David Agmashenebeli (“The Builder“) sent troops to the crusades, only to find King Baldwin of Jerusalem confiscating the Georgian churches in the Holy Land
* In 1240, a mission to Pope Gregory IX earned the response that relations with the Mongols were too valuable to endanger, and that Georgia would have to submit to the Mongol yoke
* In 1492, the Georgian king sent a delegation to Queen Isabella of Spain, offering to adopt Catholicism in exchange for support against the Ottoman Turks, only to be told that trade with the Ottomans was too important to sacrifice
* In 1715, a mission to Louis XIV-XV by King Vakhtang VI‘s uncle was told that trading relations with Iran were more important than the political and spiritual salvation of the Georgians
In 2009, Barack Obama’s offer to press the “reset” button with Russia has been rightly understood in Georgia as representing the same type of strategic calculation and true guide to their situation.
The realities are unavoidable. Most of the European leaders who expressed fervent support for Georgia expressed during and soon after the war have gone quiet. The strategic context (including Europe’s gas-supply requirements) is plainer than it once seemed; Britain’s Conservative leader David Cameron, for example, no longer declares that Russian shoppers cannot anymore expect to go on “marching into” London’s up-market Selfridges store. Georgia can no longer expect its notional ideological allies to be prepared to sacrifice litres of blood or billions of dollars: Realpolitik prevails.
The experience and advice of the other “limitrophe” states (i.e. those bordering on Russia such as Estonia and Latvia), which have learned to oppose Russian aggression with cool cunning, are now being absorbed in Georgia. A number of opinion-polls suggest that most Georgians no longer support the country’s search for Nato membership. They are, moreover, increasingly disenchanted with politicians’ slogans and rhetoric.
The most visible sign of the opposition’s protest-wave – the elaborate structures of reinforcing steel bought by Nino Burdzhanadze and welded by her supporters into rows of “cells” along Rustaveli Avenue, implying that Georgia was a police-state – have now been dismantled; the crowds that threatened to force the president’s resignation have dispersed. The compensatory gain may be a growing political maturity. The only problem is the lack of new political talent in Georgia – the much-heralded emergence of former United Nations ambassador Irakli Alasania – to assume the mantle.
The Georgian prospect
What does this profit-and-loss account of the August 2008 war suggest about Georgia’s likely future direction?
The hardline stance of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin towards Georgia contributes to the tense overall situation in the region on the war’s anniversary; but on Georgia’s own part there is no expectation that Georgia will undertake or invite renewed aggression.
The logic of Tbilisi’s current course is to move towards economic self-sufficiency. The current trading conditions render the “silk-road”-style ambition of turning Georgia into a great crossroads of international trade less plausible than homegrown solutions: for example, using Georgian brainpower and education to revivify its industries and national services.
In political terms, Georgia must now be seen to meet minimal European standards, even if European Union accession is now almost as unlikely as Nato membership. That will mean reforming the judicial system, which still bears a worrying resemblance to that of Putin’s Russia (judges may no longer take bribes, but they still take instructions from government ministers).
The question of leadership is ever-present. My guess is that Mikheil Saakashvili will hold on to power, for at least three reasons.
First, he cannot afford to lose it: he would need an impossibly wide guarantee of immunity against prosecution for so many suspected crimes, including the violent removal of opponents and colleagues.
Second, he remains – for all his serious faults – the most intelligent, energetic and adaptable figure in Georgian politics. He is not (in contrast to most of his rivals) a member of the communist-nomenklatura-turned-monopolist-élite who thrived under Eduard Shevardnadze’s régime, and can communicate fluently with Europe’s politicians (even if he has long ceased to enchant them). He has also major domestic achievements to his credit: for example, creating the unlikely outcome (where the Caucasus is concerned) of a customs-service and police-force that do not extort cash-bribes, and a higher-education system in which entry to university and appointments are based on standard qualifications and merit.
Third, and above all, every rival – with the possible exception of the outgoing ombudsman, Sozar Subari – has serious drawbacks. Salomé Zurabishvili, however intelligent and reasonable, was born in France; Irakli Alasania, an internationally respected diplomat, cannot take the heat (voted by the readers of one newspaper as Georgia’s “most constructive politician”, he is literally sickened by the abuse any politician must expect and by the character of those he must ally himself with); Nino Burdzhanadze may model herself on Margaret Thatcher and dress well enough to feature in Vogue, but has never said or done in her entire career a single thing of note (and is compromised by family connections to the old Komsomol and by enormous, unaccountable wealth).
Joe Biden on his visit to Tbilisi met a selection of four possible presidential candidates: Giorgi Targamadze, Nino Burdzhanadze, Irakli Alasania and the businessman Levan Gachechiladze. It is a reasonably sure guess that after doing so the United States vice-president will have concluded that the Americans should stay with the devil they know.
The Abkhazian proposal
A single outstanding issue – and the original casus belli – could yet upset all calculations: the fate of the territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A realistic stance and policy by Tbilisi here is even more desirable than presidential continuity. Since Eduard Kokoity’s South Ossetia has no resemblance to or potential to become a viable state – which Abkhazia has – what happens in relation to Sukhumi is vital (see Neal Ascherson, “A Chance to Join the World“, London Review of Books, 4 December 2008).
Here, then, is a proposal. If the European Union and the United States could boldly offer Abkhazia recognition of its independence, but with the demand that it be free of Russian forces and the guarantee that Georgia would not be allowed to attack and an offer of direct connections by sea to Turkey and by air to Europe – then Georgia’s initially furious reaction should eventually change to acceptance. For Georgians would come to see that a genuinely independent Abkhazia – which many Abkhaz want, but which Russia will almost certainly not permit – would be a far better neighbour to them than an Abkhazia which is just another region of Russia’s destabilised Caucasus.
Needless to say, Transcaucasia or Transcaucasus or South Caucasus is one of the most troubled regions in the world. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have three heavily disputed areas – Abkhajia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Ngorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
This region is of enormous geo-political and economic significance and all major players have a stake in the region. The regional conflicts aside, there are a number of issues in Transcaucasia which have an impact upon the foreign policies of a number of countries including Russia.
This paper seeks to analyse the Russian policy towards the Transcaucasian region. The various facets and determinants of this policy are inter-related and intertwined and are affected by a host of other issues in the region. This paper will discuss the Russian policy in the light of all such issues.
Here, a brief history of the Transcaucasian region would be in order. An independent federal Transcaucasian republic existed in 1917-18. The federation was dissolved in May, 1918, into the republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the three republics were conquered by the Red Army, the Transcaucasian Federal Socialist Republic was formed; it joined USSR in Dec. 1922 becoming one of the four original federated republics. In 1936 the three were reestablished as separate union republics. In 1991, all the three republics seceded from the USSR.
Transcaucasia has undoubtedly been the most volatile region of the erstwhile USSR since the latter’s demise in 1991. The three regional conflicts are always in news and the Russian foreign policy is tremendously impacted by it. Its policy towards these states is a crucial component of the overall Russian foreign policy and is seen by many as determining the overall tone and tenor of the Russian foreign policy. There are several umbilical cords and geo-political-economic issues that ensure that Russia vis-à-vis Transcaucasia catches everyone’s eye.
After disintegration the Russian foreign policy was heavily oriented towards the west and even in the CIS the focus was on Central Asia, Ukraine etc. A very palpable shift in the policy took place around 1993 which was triggered by several developments in the region having enormous bearing on Russian security interests and geo-political strategies. Certain ground realities dawned upon Russia in time to open its eyes to this part of the world in its immediate neighbourhood. Unlike Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were pro-west. Turkey was emerging as a major player in the region. The location of the region as a bridge between Europe and Asia, the estimated (and inflated) energy resources of the Caspian sea basin, the state-of-affairs in the north Caucasus were reminders enough for Russia to give the attention that was due to this region. Security, economy, balance of power, sphere of influence – the region was too crucial for Russia to be neglected.
Russia is multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious and is surrounded by similar diverse states. The danger for potential conflicts is more pronounced along Russia’s southern periphery and the Russian military doctrine in 1993 voiced this concern. Aggressive nationalism, religious intolerance, forces of extremism, ethno-nationalism were seen as potential threats to national security. Russia believed that these factors were more prominent in the southern direction – in the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The break up of Yugoslavia further convinced Russia that an “arc of instability” stretches from Transcaucasia to Central Asia. The developments in North Caucasus (Chechnya) further cemented Russia’s apprehensions and thereafter the Transcaucasian states never went out of the Russian radar.
If the relationship of Russia with these states is mapped on a continuum, Armenia and Georgia would be at extreme ends and Azerbaijan somewhere in the middle of the Kline. Armenia is an ‘ally’ of Russia while Georgia is an adversary. The latter is extremely apprehensive and antagonistic to Russia and the vice-versa. The Russian policy towards the three states is, in more ways than one, shaped by its policies towards the three regional conflicts. Russia is a major factor in each of the three conflicts.
Ngorno Karabakh or Mountainous Karabakh is a predominantly Armenian-populated region in the west of Azerbaijan. The conflict over the area, dating back to the first period of independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918-20, re-emerged during the Soviet period at various times of Central government weakness, most markedly in the late 1980s during Glasnost’ as Armenians demanded the annexation of the region to Armenia. Beginning in late 1987 with the forced expulsion of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia followed by demonstrations in Mountainous Karabakh and Armenia for the transfer of the region to Armenian jurisdiction, the conflict was driven to escalation in 1988 and 1989 with anti-Armenian riots in Sumgait, Baku and Ganja and a two-way ethnic cleansing campaign in the two republics.
The Soviet government failed to stop these riots or contain the conflict, and with the unexpected independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in late 1991, the conflict rapidly escalated to a full-scale war between the two countries. In spring 1992, Armenia and the ‘self-defense forces’ of Mountainous Karabakh achieved control over the entire Province and created a corridor to Armenia. The region’s parliament declared independence on 6 January 1992. A Russian brokered ceasefire was put in place in 1994.
In Georgia two major secessionist movements have defined the contours of the policies of various players in the region. The first is the problem of Abkhazia located in the north-west part of the country. Its population consists largely of Russians and the predominant religion is Islam. The Abkhazians have been demanding independence from Georgia. The latter believes that this problem arose because of Russian support and help. The eruption of this conflict compelled Russia to seek Russian mediation in 1993 and also join the CIS, however reluctantly. The role of the Russian peacekeepers remained a source of tension.
Another thorny issue in Georgia is the problem of South Ossetia. The latter want to unite with their brethren in North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian federation. South Ossetia populated mostly by ethnic Ossetians broke away from Georgia in 1990 even while the latter was still a part of the Soviet Union. Several attempts have been made to resolve these issues but in vain. The Russian mediation in the region is besotted with controversy and it is said that the Minsk initiative launched by the UN comprising of Russia, US and France did not achieve tangible results on account of lack of cooperation on part of Russia.
The politics in the region is marked by lack of mutual trust and understanding between Russia and the Transcaucasian states. Allegations and counter-allegations and not dispassionate diplomacy determine the contours of the political developments in the region. Russian support and backing to Armenia is an obvious bone of contention vis-à-vis Azerbaijan who sees it as encouragement to secessionism. There is no gainsaying the fact that the Russian support to Armenia has been crucial to the latter so much so that at times the focus of Russian policy in the regions would seem to be only the Armenia! This is not without reasons. Armenia was the only country in the region to respond to Russian overtures for friendship. It was one of the founder members of CIS along with Russia. Russia has basing rights in Armenia and above all, the latter is a predominantly Christian country. Armenia has tremendously benefited from Russian connections. President Boris Yeltsin had said, “Armenia is a Christian country. It is part of the zone of Russian interests. We should not lose Armenia and we will not do it.”
Vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia has followed a ‘carrot and stick’ approach and some may argue that the stick has been used more often than not. Georgia believes that the peace process has been overly jeopardized by Russian efforts. In fact, Russia-Georgia relations have hit a ‘nadir’, which this paper will document at a later stage. Both these countries have accused Russia of playing a partisan role in the resolution of conflicts while Russia hit back alleging encouragement to secessionism in Chechnya by these two countries.
It would be apt to discuss the Caspian Sea and the pipeline politics in the region which has definite repercussions over the policies of Russia, Transcaucasian states and other players like USA, Turkey, and Iran etc. The status of the Caspian Sea is an unresolved issue between the five littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkey) who are yet to see eye to eye over sharing its resources. Every international actor believes the Caspian Sea reserves of oil and gas are huge (Strobe Talbott had once remarked that this area sits over 200 billion barrels of oil!). Russia considers the Caspian sea a ‘Russian lake’ and the foreign ministry believes that the standards of maritime law(UN convention on the law of the sea) is not applicable.
The following excerpt from the document titled “The Position of the Russian Federation with Regard to the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” sent to the UN General Assembly, confirms that Russia will try to persuade other Caspian states to support her position by using not only the art of diplomacy, but pressure as well. “Unilateral actions in the Caspian Sea are unlawful and will not be recognized by the Russian Federation, which reserves the right to take necessary steps at any time that it considers appropriate in order to restore law and order and liquidate the consequences of unilateral actions.”
The west weary of Russian monopolistic control explored possibilities of constructing new piplelines bypassing Russia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is a reality and it severely deprives Russia of its monopolistic control over the transportation routes and in that undermines its status in the Central Asian region and Transcaucasus (however, in mid-march 2007, Greece, Russia and Bulgaria have sealed the long awaited deal to build a trans Balkan pipeline that will pump cheap crude to the Mediterranean and consolidate Russian influence in the European energy market. The $ 1.25 –dollar, 279-km pipeline will be the result of 15 years of negotiations and will bypass the congested Turkish Bosophorous straits).
Russian policy is also shaped by the European and American interest in the region. The grand chessboard theory had suggested that the US has to concentrate on Central Asia and Transcaucasia if it has to dominate the world. Also strobe Talbott had emphasized upon the enormous importance of the region more than once. The full-blown US policy after 9/11 (the great game) is too well known to be elaborated.
The western tilt of some CIS and Transcaucasian states is a major irritant to Russia and its policy is to neutralize their inclination. Russian policy towards Georgia and some recent developments speak volumes about the Russian –Transcaucasian relations. Georgia’s deep desire to become a full member of NATO and the growing US influence in the region(इधर भी अपनी टांग अदा रहा है ) (rose revolution, construction of the BTC pipeline, the train and equip programme etc.) have frequently strained Georgia’s relations with Russia. Some recent developments deserve special mention.
In February 2006, the Georgian parliament unanimously called on the government to revoke the 13-year-old peacekeeping arrangement under which Russian forces have maintained precarious peace in the region ever since South Ossetia fought a short but bloody war for independence from Georgia in 1992. Georgian MPs accused Russia of “creeping annexation of one of Georgia’s regions,” and urged the government to push for replacing the Russian peace-keepers with an international force. However, Russia is unrelenting and argues how the other side in the conflict is opposed to its withdrawal. The Russian Foreign Ministry accused Georgia’s Parliament of stirring an “anti-Russian campaign in Georgia” and stoking tension and destabilisation in the conflict zone. The Russian Parliament also responded with a strongly worded resolution which said Georgia’s plans to forcefully reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia were a “threat to Russia’s national security.”
As if this were not enough, a spy scandal broke out between the two countries in September last year. Vladimir Radyuhin, the Russian correspondent of the Hindu, has provided a detailed account of the row. Four Russian military officers were arrested in Georgia on charges of espionage and subversion and soon released but not without damage to the relations between the two nations. Georgia accused Moscow of masterminding acts of terror and sabotage on Georgian soil, and of trying to “ruin” Georgia and annex its breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s reaction was swift and harsh. It recalled its Ambassador in Georgia and pulled out all but two diplomats from the embassy. It cut all transport and postal links with Georgia, stopped issuing Russian visas to Georgians, and launched large-scale naval manoeuvres off Georgia’s Black Sea coast. The anti-Russia campaign in Georgia had gathered momentum after Mr. Saakashvili’s July 2006 visit to Washington. President Bush had assured the Georgian leader of America’s support for his bid to join NATO and restore control over Georgia’s breakaway territories. Two months later NATO offered Georgia “intensified dialogue,” the first step towards membership of the alliance.
Georgia under Saakashvili has refused to amend its Constitution to allow autonomous status to ethnic minorities, and rejected recommendations from the U.N. Security Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia against the use of force. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for their part, in numerous polls have reaffirmed their refusal to be part of Georgia and vowed to defend their independence with arms. Following the spy row, Russian authorities said Georgia would not get any migrant work quotas for its citizens and started deporting “illegal” Georgian workers and closing down Georgian businesses. Georgian workers and businessmen in Russia are estimated to be sending back home up to $2 billion annually, which is comparable to Georgia’s budget revenues. Russia also indefinitely extended a ban on Georgia’s main export items — wine and mineral water — introduced last winter on health grounds. Also, Russia suspended its troop withdrawal from Georgia under the 2005 agreement with Georgia to close its two military bases in Georgia and pull out 3000 military personnel by the end of 2008.
South Ossetia overwhelmingly (99 per cent) voted for independence in a referendum in November 2007. Georgia of course did not recognize it as legitimate just as the similar plebiscite in 1992.
The Kosovo issue provides tremendous leverage to Russia vis-à-vis Transcaucasia. The Russian leader has made it clear that Western plans to grant independence to Kosovo, a breakaway territory of Serbia, will strengthen Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s bid for independence from Georgia. President Putin has rejected the West’s attempts to qualify Kosovo as a “unique case,” and has said Kosovo must be treated as a “universal case,” that is, one that will set a precedent for breakaway regions in other parts of the world, including the former Soviet Union.
The West looks certain to push through independence for Kosovo, but thereby it will give Moscow a free hand in dealing with the problem of rebel territories not only in Georgia, but also in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Moldova (Transdniestre). If Russia recognises the independence of all or some of these territories, this is bound to have a wider international fallout. And Russia, in all probability, will not want to miss the enormous bargaining power that this issue will give it.
All said and done, transcaucasia remains a very important region for Russia. Especially under Putin, Russia and its immediate borders have been emphasized. Neighbours are dealth with in a much more pragmatic manner based on an assessment of benefits to Russia.
To sum up, Russia enjoys good neighbourly relations with Azerbaijan. Putin was in Azerbaijan in early 2006 with a large business delegation and the leader of Azerbaijan paid a visit to Moscow in December 2006. So, Russia is reassessing its relations with Azerbaijan. The most difficult part of Russian relations in the region is with Georgia. From a Russian perspective, Georgia cannot afford to alienate Russia. While Georgia considers Russia part of the problem rater than the solution!
The region is likely to see more activity, claims and counterclaims, so suggest circumstantial evidences. US plans to deploy elements of a missile defence system in Eastern Europe (Poland and Czechoslovakia), Putin’s blunt message to the west in the annual security conference in February 2007 and the promotion of a ‘hawk’ Igor Ivanov as the first deputy PM are indications enough that Russia’s ‘strategic retreat’ is over and it is back on the world stage as a key player and the Transcaucasian region is very much a part of that world stage.
***
BIBLIOGRAPHY Chenoy, A.M. Foreign policy of new Russia. Shamsuddin, Nationalism in Russia and Central Asian Republics. Imam, Zafar. Foreign Policy of Russia. Contemporary Central Asia Central Asian Survey World Focus The Hindu Frontline
The Hindu In this August 7, 2009 photo National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan with Dai Bingguo, State Councillor and Special Representative on the boundary issue of the People’s Republic of China, before the India-China delegation-level talks at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi. Photo: V.V.Krishnan
What the overreaction in India to an anonymous post on an obscure Chinese website calling for “splitting India” reveals about the challenges of understanding China’s changing information landscape.
Whoever the anonymous Internet user “Zhong Guo Zhuan Le Gang” (literally, “Chinese strategist”) is, he must be quite pleased with himself. Little more than a week ago, a post by him appeared on an obscure Chinese website calling for China to “break up” the “Hindu Religious State” of India for its own strategic gains. The post was translated and analysed, with some significant errors, by a Chennai-based think-tank, following which reports appeared in the Indian media expressing outrage that “Beijing” had a secret plan to divide India by supporting separatist movements in Kashmir and the Northeast.
Leave aside for a moment the contents of the post, which to most readers with even a little understanding of foreign policy reveals an inexperienced writer with poor understanding of India, far removed from a supposedly influential Chinese strategist. Also leave aside the question of whether having broken-up states on its borders with the troubled Xinjiang region and in north-east India even really suits Chinese interests. The real question to be asked here is why and how does an anonymous post by an insignificant Chinese blogger generate such attention and consternation in India? Part of the answer lies in the media reports that appeared last week, which made the following assumptions: an influential Chinese strategist must have been behind the suggestions; he must have had the tacit backing of Beijing since all opinion in China is controlled by the government; and that the website where this post appeared sounded influential enough for India to take notice and worry.
But in these assumptions are fundamental misperceptions. For one, there is a tendency to assume every view expressed by a Chinese strategist or newspaper – let alone an anonymous blogger — is inextricably linked to Beijing and the Chinese government’s views.
This tendency is located in the prevalence of the idea of a monolith China and “Chinese” view which dominates Indian perceptions. This was especially evident last week, when news reports in national newspapers, without exception, linked the claims made by the anonymous blogger to “what Beijing thinks”.
This perception dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the only opinions coming out of China were voiced through one or two State-run organs, and often closely mirrored the Chinese government’s views. The last decade has seen the emergence of a completely different information landscape in China. Yet the manner in which this information is processed and interpreted in India remains rooted in the past. The nineties saw the emergence of dozens of new newspapers in China, a few dozen think-tanks in Beijing and a proliferation of voices expressed through the Internet. Currently, there are four main avenues through which information emerges out of China. Their status and roles need spelling out, as understanding and evaluating the nature of this information is crucial for India to create a level of discourse that allows for a more layered analysis of China’s opportunities and threats.
Most significant is the official channel through China’s Foreign Ministry, which voices China’s official position on issues. The second, more complicated channel is print media. There are dozens of newspapers in Beijing, and most are State-owned. But each enjoys a unique relationship with both the government and the Communist Party (CPC), and consequently, their opinions need to be interpreted contextually. For instance, the People’s Daily, the CPC’s mouthpiece, often articulates the Party’s stand, which does not necessarily reflect the Chinese government’s official position. Recently, the paper ran a strong editorial aimed at India, crudely belittling India’s political status and calling for a stronger Chinese stand on the border dispute and other issues.This was interpreted in India as the Chinese government changing its position.
While the Chinese government on occasion does use the newspaper to articulate its views, the newspaper is more often used by different factions within the CPC in internal debates and has less impact on actual policy. For instance, some groups within the CPC favour a more hawkish attitude to India, and others in the government a more conciliatory position. The distinction between Party and Government is not often clear even in China. This poses a challenge for Indian observers to tease out what opinions really matter to the countries’ relationship, and what opinions are no more than postures adopted for the sake of internal party politics and are less relevant to the countries’ ties. The third category, also diverse, is think-tanks. In the last decade, dozens of think-tanks — many with similar sounding names, to add to the confusion — have emerged in China. The fourth and newest avenue of information is the Internet, through Chinese blogs and websites.
Confusion between the last two categories was at the heart of last week’s uproar. The post in question appeared on an important-sounding website calling itself the International Institute of Strategic Studies (which has no relation to the London-based think-tank of the same name). The Chennai Centre for China Studies, which first translated and analysed the post before it was circulated among the Indian media, assumed that this was a government-sponsored think-tank, and also wrongly claimed that this was linked to the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), a Beijing think-tank. But a quick check revealed that the IISS website where the post appeared actually has no government ties, and is by no means an established Beijing think-tank — it’s just a website. Scholars at the CIISS and other institutes said they hadn’t even heard of it, and expressed amusement at the media circus that the obscure website had caused in India.
The website’s founder Kang Lingyi issued a clarification saying his website was independent and had no link to the government. What news reports did not mention was Mr. Kang, who is only in his twenties, represents a fringe firebrand nationalistic viewpoint that has in the past tried to stir public opinion against another neighbour of China’s — Japan. Mr. Kang’s views often reflect those of a section known in China as the “Fenqing” — it literally translates to “Angry Youth”, but when pronounced slightly differently describes such youth in a far less kind way, one that’s not fit to print. This reflects the position these views hold in the mainstream in China — and the error in assuming these fringe views mirror Beijing’s position. But even the nationalistic Mr. Kang distanced himself from the post and stressed that in no way did his website approve of its message.
News reports also claimed the write-up could not have been published without the permission of the Chinese authorities — another dubious claim tied to the simplistic notion that the Chinese government vets every opinion expressed on all of China’s hundreds of political websites. The Chinese government blocks and censors numerous websites that are politically sensitive, discussing subjects like the Tiananmen Square protests or the Falun Gong. But suggesting that the government controls and moderates debates and political opinions in blogs and newspapers is a stretch.
It also belies a lack of understanding of the changing nature of China’s information landscape. China has 338 million Internet users and more than 100 million blogs and websites, such as the one where this post first appeared. It only takes a quick glance through half a dozen such sites – even “influential” ones – to look at the divergence of opinions and vibrancy of debates, with many voices even strongly criticising the Communist Party and its government. Yet the simplistic perception still endures in India that in authoritarian China, every analyst or writer must surely speak in the same voice.
Interpreting information from these four avenues is further complicated by the fact that they are sometimes inter-linked. For instance, the Chinese government sometimes uses influential think-tanks to hint at changes in policy. Views and opinions from mainstream Chinese newspapers and think-tanks must indeed be taken seriously in India. But at the same time, a more nuanced understanding of China’s information landscape is needed to avoid shrill hyper-reactions to anonymous bloggers and irrelevant fringe groups.
This is crucial to creating a level of discourse in India that allows for a deeper, more meaningful engagement with China’s opportunities and threats.
